Seen by many as one of the greatest tragedies of the 20th Century, and by others as a massive victory worthy of praise, the collapse of the USSR marks one of the most significant, life-changing, and controversial events in world history. Its aftershock effects not only radiated through the fifteen republics and the Eastern Bloc, but also would see change on the entire globe. This is understood by most people who have at least a small understanding of world history. What's less understood, however, is what lead to its cause. Many will simply point to one thing: "communism inevitably fails" or "it was a dictatorship." Some even say it was doomed from the start, where others will point to some factors without mentioning others. Endless arguments can be made about what's true, and what isn't. We can never be 100% sure regardless of your narrative. With that said, I have a plethora of opinions myself based on things that
are true, and a lot of extensive research has been done by many on the topic. Roger Keeran and Thomas Kenny put out a book more than a decade following that fateful year, titled
Socialism Betrayed - Behind The Collapse Of The Soviet Union. I'm taking it upon myself to do a deep dive of this work, break it down as best I can, and present some of my own understandings of it.
To get a decent comprehension, it's first important to know what the USSR accomplished during its existence, and note the largest changes upon its fall, which is what the book opens on. The Soviet Union was the first nation to eliminate unemployment, homelessness, inflation, and poverty. No other country has rapidly grown its quality of life and consumption to such a degree in such a short time-frame. In only decades, it brought the feudal status of the Russian Empire to the level of a world power that rivaled the U.S., which had been growing for over 150 years by then. Healthcare and education were seen as essential, and trade-unions could veto firing as well as recall managers. Food and housing prices were subsidized. All of this certainly had its struggles, considering outside invasion, fighting world wars, brutal sanctioning, weather conditions, and having to work with what they had. Thus, it would be unfair to call this any kind of paradise, but the building of a worker's state allowed so much growth for its people. By the time the the early '90s rolled around, all of this would be reversed. The toppling of these systems would see some of the worst reverse outcomes on citizens. The counterweight to imperialism and colonialism was now gone, having an effect on the entire world. American military power would now dominate the world, shifting the narrative from anti-communism to globalism. The U.S. saw this as the "end of history" (a phrase that pretty openly points to the problem of American exceptionalism, and those who think the world revolves around America), and it was said that capitalism had won.
Simplified Soviet History
Nearly a century of a nation's time coming to an end couldn't be seen as a failure simply by ceasing to exist, and inherently having defect from the start certainly offers nothing, looking at the history. Sure, there may have been complications in all periods, but you could say this about anything from the Mongol Empire to the British Empire. Were those inherent failures? Do either exist in 2022? Certainly not. Economic crises and popular uprising didn't cause Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms, but it was quite the reverse, if you look at the events chronologically. His reforms mishandled all underlying issues that any nation could face, and worked as the straw the broke the camel's back. So it's important to look into the general history and trends that may have lead to such a position. The next section breaks down the Soviet Union by eras based off of their leaders.
Reforms aren't evil in and of themselves, rather it's how they're handled. Lenin himself saw this as early as 1921 with the New Economic Plan, or NEP. At the Tenth Congress of the Bolshevik Party, he proposed this plan to allow peasants to freely exchange surplus grain, as well as allowing small markets to exist, all for the purpose of regrouping down the road following the civil war and other constraints. This would be a necessary time period without the aid of revolutions in the west. Following Lenin's death in 1924, it came down to three different options for how to proceed. One option would be that of Leon Trotsky's thinking, with the idea that Russia could not sustain nor build socialism on its own, pushing for revolutions elsewhere prior to continuing forward. This eventually lead to the Left Opposition, a traitorous group whose strategies would work underground with fascist powers, despite being turned down by 1925. Mass industrialization could commence after this period, a very necessary effort. The thinking of Nikolai Bukharin was another option, which was to build a state around the petty bourgeoisie. He believed that the capitalist phase could not move so quickly. This line of thinking was gone by 1927, leaving only the ideas of Joseph Stalin.
Right about here is where we would see the start of agricultural collectivization, the next phase proposed by Lenin's plan. Stalin had four facets to how he would carry out the growth of socialism. For starters, his rejection of Trotsky would show his belief in socialism in one country. With this, he would move past Bukharin's problematic solution and focus on heavy industry, financed with agricultural exports. Thanks to the inability to work with foreign aid from western sanctions, this was needed for mass industrialization. Mechanized production was the third piece, needed from large-scale industrial farms, changing the ways of the backwater, underdeveloped Czarist Russia. Finally, the central planning would frame all of this together. Industrialization was emphasized due to the impending war, ignored by Bukharin, but seen as a vital step for Stalin. It was his three decades of leadership that brought on the ability to raise the wealth and know-how ability of industry, as well as raising the education levels in all republics.
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Nikita Khrushchev with
Joseph Stalin |
Struggle would not cease in this time period, especially when you consider some of the disasters in the 1930s. We won't go into detail of these, since those basically require their own breakdown. But political difference over the socialist future certainly continued under Stalin. Even at the highest levels, there was political discourse, such as with Zhdanov and Malenkov, and it followed after Stalin's death under Khrushchev. In fact, it's his leadership that would begin unrolling conditions that would allow for a future dissolution. While some advancements were made, it was his "secret speech" that took the unbalanced approach at condemning Stalin.
Vyacheslav Molotov, Georgi Malenkov, Lazar Kaganovich, and K.E. Voroshilov would see this as giving no credit to his contributions to building the nation, nor would it give validity to certain repressions (read more on that here). That was only the beginning. He would also begin decentralization, and incorporate too much marketization and capitalist production. Inevitably, that lead to a focus on light industry, placing a race for consumer goods against the U.S. which would not be possible to win. Bad situations were made worse when he would cut spending on military and other necessities. Lenin's praise of Stalin before his death was highly ignored, focusing only on his remark about him being rude. Incomplete or exaggerated anti-Stalin campaigns would spearhead division, producing results below the desired outcome at times. Soviet archival evidence would estimate executions between 1921 and 1953 to number around 799,455. This is far below the different sets of "millions" that anti-Soviet scholars would come up with. A whole period of revisionism would foreshadow Gorbachev to a scary degree.Khrushchev's handling of aid in socialist nations of the world was decent. Putting missiles in Cuba in 1962 and intervening the counterrevolution of Hungary in 1956 would see to this, but he was too trusting in the U.S. to also cut down on military size alongside him as he began that, shown later in Vietnam. Eventually, collective leadership would force him to retire, where Leonid Brezhnev took over to fill the shoes until 1982. Stagnation was symbolized in him, through poor health, personal vanity and political weakness. While little was overtly revisionist, enacting change was seldom, and the loss of the peoples' fervor would show with the aging leaders, considering we're moving to a third generation removed from Lenin's movement. That said, we do have to credit him for aiding socialist movements in nations like Angola, Vietnam, Nicaragua, and Afghanistan, as well as for fighting Apartheid in South Africa.
Opportunity to tackle the aforementioned issues arose with Yuri Andropov. With a strong Marxist-Leninist base, firm leadership experience, and a good grasp on the stagnating issues, he would see to reforms in a way that could have prevented the collapse. Unfortunately, he didn't have time on his side. Communists took a lot of hope in him, as he stressed the importance of cultural consciousness, rational diet and consumption, quality of public services, and the use of free-time over basing quality of life on consumerism the way it was in the west. He also had a tough background in dealing with the counterrevolution in Hungary of 1956. This occurred from following 25 years under Nazi occupation in a mostly peasant-based community. The growing pains were co-opted by fascists, which lead to the beating and killing of communists and their leaders. Andropov's hand in dealing with this revealed his will. Timing wasn't great, considering the second cold war that had opened under Carter (and worsened by Reagan). The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), also known as Star Wars, made relations with the U.S. more challenging, leading him to conclude that imperialism could not be stopped by idly standing beside the problem. His tough minded approach led to reforms that were left on the board following his death, remaining during Chernenko's time without much action put towards them.
Second Economy
The second economy is something that basically never gets talked about, regardless of narrative. It may sound like a different class of people, however it was anything but. Instead, this was private activity that allowed workers extra money on the side, be it legal or illegal. Capitalism existing aside socialism isn't too foreign of an idea, especially when you consider that the peasantry only made up 20% of the population by 1985, compared to 83% in 1926. This was kept under proper restrain under Stalin, and was significantly boosted with Khrushchev. Obviously the state cannot account for every transaction across an entire nation, so it was only logical for legal private activity to remain as needed, so long it's kept in bounds. The black market certainly became a problem, one that is not unique to socialism, as we know many exist in, and sometimes even run, capitalist nations.
What exactly did legal private activity include? Housing was the biggest one, assuming you were housing yourself and your family, and not hoarding property. Doctors, dentists, teachers, and tutors could use their knowledge on the side for extra cash, as could craftsman work on houses and other private affairs. Private prospectors could mine and sell ore to the state, and anyone could sell personal belongings they no longer wanted. This all served the purpose of filling in the cracks of the public sector, fulfilling wants that it couldn't always meet. The legal second economy wasn't an issue.
Illegal money making proved to be the problem. The lack of lawful control of this under Khrushchev would create a spike, and a surge towards rendering the legal private market less useful. This often came from time and material being stolen from the public sector, which was often carried out by gangs and criminals. A need for reform would present itself as issues would continue to grow into the '60s and '70s. Cadres in the party, typically those who followed Bukharin, would sometimes take advantage of this, or accept bribes, allowing for corruption. The fact of the matter is that none of this was enough to destroy the Soviet economy until Gorbachev weaponized it into his own interests, and fanned the flames that could have been put out. Communist party members unfortunately weren't aware of the danger of this until it was too late. By the end of 1988, wholesale private trade with the interests of the black market became legal, which caused the shortages, discontent in the outlying republics, and eventually mass protests.
Perestroika And Gorbachev
To put it the way that the book did, Perestroika (restructuring) was not the outcome of the USSR's inevitable demise, but was the cause of a set of balkanized countries that became dominated by oligarchies and lawless capitalism that impoverished many. While in a tough state, you could not compare the Soviet Economy prior to this to that of 1920s Germany or The Great Depression in the U.S. Issues and shortages did exist by this point, but not to the point of rampant opposition to the system. Perestroika was what caused the massive discontent, not the inverse. Even in 1990, only about 4% of the population favored removing price control, and about 18% advocated for private property.
Gorbachev more or less took advantage of a bad situation in a way that would serve his own interests, as noted. I already mentioned the increased pressure caused by the arms race from the United States. This was done through reckless spending to fund opposition movements in Poland, Afghanistan, etc. The latter costed the Soviet economy 3-4 billion dollars per year, thanks to western warlords. Tens of billions was needed in order to combat Star Wars. Radio Free Europe was a Reagan-funded form of ideological warfare, allowing him to pump opposition propaganda into the Eastern Bloc.
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| Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin |
But Gorbachev didn't use these to his advantage immediately. It made sense that people supported him in the beginning, as he would carry out Andropov's policies until 1987. After that, his use of Andropov's Glasnast (openness) got distorted. Instead of its intended use for openness to the party, state, and government from the public to fight corruption, it was handed over to platforms that were hostile to the CPSU. Complete control of the media to enemies of socialism, allowing them to distort history and Marxism to fit their narrative, was handed over. Despite being responsible for the reforms, he would act as an innocent bystander with representatives of the media to incite attacks on those very reforms. Agitprop leaders worked on fronts to transform unions of creative writers and filmmakers into tools to push liberal approaches in culture. That played a hand in helping Gorbachev's partitions into leadership roles.
To sum it up, a journalist by the name of Mike Davidow stated that "Never in history did a ruling party literally turn over the mass media to forces bent on its own destruction and the state it led, as did the leaders of the CPSU.” Anti-imperialist means were stopped, and by 1987 Gorbachev was completely contradicting his initial policies. To make matters worse in the outlying republics, Russian nationalism took an extra step forward with his reign, a problem that was slowly growing as is. Take Kazakhstan, for example. Only 40% of their population by this point was made up of Kazakhs, causing them to feel like outsiders in their own land. Leader Dinmukhamed Kunaev, a Kazakh native, was replaced with Gennadi Koblin, a Russian who had no experience with the land or culture. That fatal move caused massive uprising in Kazakhstan, leading to attacks on buildings and state headquarters. But these riots in Alma-Ata were only the beginning.
1987-1988
1987's Central Committee Plenum and the Nineteenth Party Conference of 1988 would see the turning point with the undermining of Soviet socialism. A campaign to (again) revise party history was launched, particularly at Stalin. The withdrawal of Afghanistan agreement was not aligned with a demand of the U.S. to do the same thing. Thus, aid to the mujahedeen continued, and harm to Afghan communists and party leaders was no longer prevented. The Brezhnev Doctrine (which allowed intervention to counterrevolutions in satellite states) was also abandoned.
Any strong leader knows that reforms are necessary in times of trouble; what's important is how they're carried out, which I touched on earlier. Lenin had done this properly in 1918 with the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, and in 1921 with the NEP. In 1939, Stalin signed a non-aggression pact with Germany since other western nations wouldn't join him. Acts like this are meant to be a small backwards step in a period of struggle in exchange for a greater step forward down the line. Reagan's drastic escalation of the arms race nearly made this unavoidable. Gorbachev, instead of working in the interest of the people, adopted a capitalist model. What exactly did this entail?
Half of the Soviet economy gained the right to buy and sell output in wholesale, private markets after the reduction of state orders. By 1988, consumer shortages ran so rampant that the nations saw inflation for the first time since World War II. 1,064 departments and 465 sectors of central committees were slashed in the union republics, undermining leaders' willingness to follow directives from Moscow; the party's withdrawal from the economy saw this through. Huge protests in the Baltics broke out by July of 1988, and the economic crises set off by these reforms only strengthened nationalist separation. Power over production was being handed over to private owners, preventing people without money from reaching needs.
1989-1991
By 1989, popular up-rise against Gorbachev could be seen everywhere, but this wasn't a call for capitalism. At first, repression against Baltic protesters was tried, before being flipped into negotiations. By 1990, dual leadership now existed, with Boris Yeltsin leading Russia, and Gorbachev the USSR. Corrupt leaders now had the ability to transform state property into private property of their own self-interest. Second economy wealth flowed into the pockets of rising pro-capitalist politicians.
While a U.S. war buildup could certainly strain Soviet Union, it alone couldn't crush it, as shown. Abandoning third-world allies was exchanged for financial support from the west, which meant ending arms shipments to Nicaragua, despite the terrorization caused by U.S.-backed contras. Soviet betrayal and a tightening of the U.S. embargo saw Cuba's GDP cut in half. An independent Yugoslavia and hope for independence in Africa, a continent most heavily wronged by imperialism, were all left at the hands of NATO.
This also aided in a collapse of Eastern Bloc countries. Ending the subsidies of oil, gas, and raw materials for easy exchange of consumer goods from the USSR sent the Eastern European nations into economic shock; they now had to rely on the western capitalist states. These nations already had foundational weakness. It was less rooted in socialism from popular movements carried out by the people, and more from Red Army advancements during wartimes. As the book puts it, it was less "home grown."
Soviet workers voted in March of 1991 to preserve the union, 76.4% voting in favor. Six of the fifteen republics didn't favor it in majority, that being the Baltics, Moldova, Georgia, and Armenia. This was heavily ignored, and the SCSE, allies of Boris Yeltsin, had become the government. An attempted and failed coup in 1991 sealed the fate, and on December 31, 1991, the USSR was done away with. Yeltsin banned the CPSU, the CPRF, and took over everything in Russia, backed by large masses who faced several years of misery under Gorbachev.
Popular Criticisms
Within only three years following the collapse, the economy was in such atrocious shape that production output was cut in half from its already disastrous amount in 1991. The five pillars of this really boil down to party liquidation, media handover to enemies, privatizing the public economy, pushing separatism, and surrendering to imperialistic forces. Since its collapse, a lot has been learned about the history with the aid of Soviet archives and declassified information. Example? Bourgeoisie historians will number Stalin's victims anywhere from five, to twenty, to one hundred million, showing the sorry state of historical understanding. Yet, some have since retreated from this idea, as the archives prevent anti-communists from having the final word. As the book says, the best way to honor the USSR's memory is to learn from these lessons, and prevent it from ever happening again.
Before getting to my own conclusions, we should observe the "reasons" that the authors disprove at the end that tend to be strawman arguments. First and foremost is the idea that socialism is inherently flawed. The "human nature" argument gets tossed around, but few historians will subscribe to this. It fails to explain how the Soviet economy survived agricultural collectivization and German invasion in World War II, yet somehow "fell apart" during the lighter challenges that arose by the 1980s.
Secondly, popular opposition is usually brought up. This hardly holds any weight, considering that the opposition happened following Gorbachev's reforms, not before them. It was this action that kicked mass protests into power, not just the nature of the Soviet economy. Next would be the effect of external factors. This holds a little more weight than either of the first two reasons, as they at least played a part in the overall collapse, though were far less than the actual cause. The pressure from the U.S. arms race wasn't as problematic as that of the sanctions and foreign invasions during the union's earlier days. So this can't be a single-factor explanation.
Bureaucratic Counterrevolution is a less often noted idea but one worth mentioning. The issue with it is that from 1983-1993, the party simply reacted to the events carried out, which in that timeframe were very inconsistent. True, some party members certainly went the opportunist direction, but it still backed three inconsistent events in particular: Andropov's Marxist-Leninist reforms in 1983, Gorbachev's revisionism in 1987, and Yeltsin's shock therapy in 1993. This shows no signs of the party rising up against the leaders, but reacting to them as events unfolded.
And lastly, "lack of democracy" and Gorbachev himself are tossed in, which somewhat tie into the prior reason. Saying there was a lack of democracy is objectively wrong, considering that the Soviet state had a higher percentage of workers involved in the government than any capitalist state. Disunity and lack of active participation wouldn't have allowed them to defend themselves in World War II, and building a strong socialist state never would have commenced. Moreover, socialism has embraced democracy from the start with its classical root in ruling of the lower classes. Liberalism, on the other hand, only gradually claimed democracy as a value when it was convenient.
My Conclusions
With the gist of the book broken down, considering it's a heavier source for my own explanation, I can't recommend giving it a read yourself enough. It's wonderfully sourced, descriptive, and does far more justice than I could here. Almost all of my reasonings are mentioned somewhere in these texts, with the addition of a few more points.
For starters, it's worth acknowledging that while Gorbachev spearheaded the movement to take down the entire apparatus, it wasn't just him, but things that allowed him to take power. The biggest of this is the fact that the party got way to bureaucratic over time. As the book mentioned, the further the leaders got from Lenin's initial people movement, the less interest the public was going to take in the leadership. Poor health and old age became a common factor the closer we got to the collapse, and this certainly prevented party members from being wary of the dangers on the horizon. Party participation was still high, but you can be a member of something and still take little interest in it. It may also be worth mentioning the Chernobyl incident, which shook an already problematic state. It certainly didn't cause people to favor the government any further.
Secondly, Khrushchev's revisionism had several outlying effects that were never dealt with properly. While some of his tactics proved to be effective, like focusing on the Soviet Space Program, he stepped a bit too far into the marketization and desire for consumer goods. For most of Stalin's era, the country was in the midst of industrialization, fixing the backwater remnants left by a feudal Russian Empire, facing merciless sanctions from the west, defending themselves from Nazi Germany, and working out the kinks on building socialism with party disagreement. So it only makes sense that once all of this resolved, the nation was able to kick back a bit. But Destalinization and overemphasis on the consumer markets proved fatal. For one, it allowed for the stagnation, and caused rifts of distrust from certain allies, letting revisionism cause internal distrust. Externally, it's ultimately what lead to the Sino-Soviet split, another event that shook communism, giving the west a point of weakness to weaponize. If that's not enough, the second economy to got out of control, especially when black markets weren't properly dealt with. The "promise of communism by 1980" was just ridiculous, and completely ignored what's needed in order to achieve the higher stage of communism.
Russian nationalism is something that the book addresses, but I hardly think is talked about enough in typical leftist circles. The reason for Lenin's creation of the republic borders was to give ethnic regions their own autonomy, boosting the motivation for sticking with the Bolshevik party in the first place. In the latter years, Russians filling up leadership roles in outlying republics caused friction, and straight up revolt near the end. It completely went against the National Question that was originally held up wonderfully.
Dangers of competing with the west in consumer goods output did more harm than help. Several times, it's mentioned how propaganda got worked into the Soviet borders, and as citizens saw certain luxuries from the west, it pushed for a demand that couldn't be matched. Even many capitalist countries would have faced the same problem. Creating this "culture war" mentality was no good, as it stirred up interest without proper explanation of how a consumer-based economy doesn't provide the needs that are met with a socialist/worker's state. In other words, it allows for an idealization of capitalism that doesn't exist, and ultimately, the Soviets lost this culture war that never should have happened in the first place. While I understand the importance of keeping outside influence in check, it's a criticism that I have even of modern day People's Republic of China. I'd even go as far as saying that the Berlin Wall wasn't a good idea. Not only did it cause a disunity between a nation, but again, created this mindset of each side selling the other on why they're better (or worse). This isn't a knock on the GDR, but just one facet of it that I personally don't like.
Speaking of which, the Eastern Bloc as a whole was problematic, and something that I criticize more than most other past and present socialist states. A revolutionary state without an actual revolution is rather counterintuitive. I'm not saying life under all of these states sucked, but there was far more to complain about. Most of them were within grips of prior empires and occupations, and while I'm ok with the Soviets' use of arms to put down fascist uprisings and counterrevolution, it shouldn't have done any occupation further than that. Losing that support after decades of basically being satellites clearly didn't sit well with many Eastern Europe citizens. Truly, seeing that the socialist states that survived this time period weren't bound to others in leadership (China, Cuba, The DPRK, etc.), it also goes to show that independence from country to country is important.
There's no doubt that the Soviet Union achieved wonders in its time, and did anything but fail. Quality of life, and life expectancy went up significantly (save for the World War II period). The nation industrialized and nearly caught up to the United States in a fraction of the time. Stalin crushed Nazi Germany even after invasion and millions of casualties. The USSR beat the United States in every corner of the space race outside of landing on the moon first, a fake parameter that the west set up to give the illusion of winning. Revolutions took after Lenin's model all over the world, especially within oppressed borders. Needs were met for the majority of its existence, and it would be completely silly to say that ceasing to exist is equivalent to failure. If that's the case, then the poorest existing capitalist country must meet the definition of success to people who hold this belief. Capitalist nations yield millions of deaths due to its material conditions every year, but it's never measured the same. The USSR was the literal first experiment outside of the Paris Commune, and to say it failed is to say that every empire, pact, or alliance prior to it also failed. With all of its flaws, the USSR brought a lot of innovation into the world medically and technologically; there's so much to take away. A lot of things could have and should have been carried out differently, which could be said about any nation. But like the book said, the best way to honor it is to learn from the lessons it spawned.
