I’ll admit right from the gate that this title could be misleading, as it isn’t so much a narrative around whether the repressions happened or not, as it may suggest at first glance. Rather, it’s a deep look into what caused the repressions, who was actually responsible, and how they could happen under the nose of Stalin if his hand wasn’t the one that orchestrated the mass repressions. The book’s intro and ending goes through this very point, and as a matter of fact, the last couple of chapters are not only some of the most important, but some of the best chapters in the book readability-wise.
For the bulk of it, Yezhov Vs. Stalin is a very dry read. It shouldn’t come as much of a surprise, seeing that many of the broken-down sections contain parts from interviews that were actually given at the Moscow Trials and other documentation taken right from the Soviet archives, much of which was classified for decades. Sourcing, for the most part, checks out, because of this. Furr not only refers to direct documents from the era, but also notes claims made by other respected historians of the subject, such as J. Arch Getty. Cross references with sources that he considers to be less valid, or not sourced in good faith (if at all) are brought up from time to time to point out contradictions within their own words, and why they aren’t correct. Additionally, weblinks are added in some footnotes to allow the reader to type it in themselves and check out the evidence he’s referring to. My only real gripe is that sometimes he cites his own work, which in super small doses like this is fine, but not preferred. This was only really done in instances where he sums up something else related, but doesn’t want to stray from the point too much. There are also a few spots that use wikipedia, which is fine for non-controversial research, however for this I’m unsure if I would have used it. Regardless, there is a lot of great work cited, with plenty of evidence to back his claims. A few questionable ones as well, but not enough to be concerned.
But like I said, things are presented very matter-of-factly, not leaving much room for extrapolation. A good majority of this will present the evidence exactly as is, with little intermissions of his own comments to point out why something is (or isn’t) evidence regarding the repressions or democracy in the USSR. Thus, the reading experience itself can be an absolute trudge to get through, especially if memorizing many Russian names of others involved isn’t a strength of yours.
Things are formatted chronologically, beginning with USSR democracy and the drafting of a new constitution. The first few chapters are harder to get through since this is an even dryer subject than the bulk of the Yezhov parts. Outlining this shows how the struggle of organizing secret-ballot elections following a bloody civil war and years of rebuilding from a backwards empire had complications. Focusing on elections, the need for greater democracy was stressed not only by Josef Stalin, but also by Andrei Zhandov and Nikolai Shvernik. Factions and opposition parties meant to undermine the CPSU were illegal, a point meant to display the difference between laws preventing corruption or coup, not being democratic.
Right around here is when the conspiracy talk begins. Details on the Mikhail Tukhachevskii Affair are laid out, which was his confession to be working alongside Nikolai Bukharin as a German agent as early as 1928. This would set into motion the rest of the conspiracy sections and the documentations of each, some being presented with evidence of happening, while others were made up by oppositionists. Furr points out how this is all completely ignored by anti-communist historians that, rather than looking at the actual history, would instead follow the Anti-Stalin paradigm. This term is repeated throughout the book, and it always stresses the fact that all of this is commonly rejected as bogus, and a Stalin frame-up to dispute all of the evidence. It’s then to be understood that the election implementation taking place around this time got glossed over considering these conditions, and the rising of fascist Spain, Finnish aggression, and anticommunist pacts arming up in the west.
Trotsyists, Rights, and Zinovievists are mentioned throughout, as these clandestine types were the seeds that lead to the conspiracies after the United Opposition was defeated in 1927 and Trotsky expelled from the USSR in 1929. Understandings of members being in contact with Japan, Germany, and other powers were revealing themselves more and more as the 1930s progressed forward, including attempted coup and assassination of Stalin and his leadership. Sergei Kirov was a close-companion of Stalin that was murdered early on, which was another large spark in 1934. Leonid Nikalaev, the murderer and his accomplices, were executed.
Where Nikolai Yezhov enters the picture is when news of him using his power in the NKVD for mass suppressions is uncovered. Lavrentiy Beria takes over, and the repressions are immediately stopped. Roughly halfway through the book is when we reach Yezhov’s confessions. This information is also pointed out to always be suppressed by anti-Soviet researchers, despite all of the information being available to them. Furr also notes why these reports check out to be what Yezhov himself wanted to say, and how no other evidence has yet contradicted this.
Room for motivation is plentiful, as several chapters are dedicated to. One of Yezhov’s reasons was to cause distrust amongst Soviet citizens by curating mass arrests and repressions, and gain opposition to the Bolshevik Party. Arresting anyone who got in his way was also a tactic to win himself power in the politburo. Yezhov had personal gains to achieve through working with foreign powers; the killing of Stalin and Vyacheslav Molotov was just the final step. In these sections, Furr begins to show counter-evidence by researchers following the Anti-Stalin paradigm, such as dissecting and pointing out contradictions in passages by the likes of Jansen and Petrov. This is to do away with the misconception that Stalin saw Yezhov as his “loyal executioner.” Interrogations of Yezhov are outlined to dig up as much evidence as possible, which should make it easy to understand why this format gets very difficult to follow after a while.
Nikolai Yezhov
Others close to Yezhov are interrogated as well, with confessions from Mikhail Frinovskii, Samoilovich Liushkov (who agreed to be a spy for Japan), and Stanislav Frantsevich Redens, showing their roles in the plot to seize politburo power and the unfolding of events that led to Yezhov’s mass repressions. Shown are their connections to foreign capitalist powers and how they will be recognized once this work is carried out. These are detailed to reinforce what is referred to as Ezhovchina throughout the book, when Yezhov himself is interrogated for several chapters, tying it all together. Near the end, the role of GULAG is mentioned, and how the prisoners themselves were used to further their plan.
The last few chapters of the book concludes all of this, and revisits the outlined points of “did the repressions happen, who was responsible, and if it isn’t Stalin, how could he have been oblivious to everything?” This follows source criticisms to validate where all of the information came from as it was used. It’s noted that the term “Great Terror” is misleading in and of itself, not because no terror happened, but because it’s attributed to Stalin and meant to be understood as an intentional mass murder or imprisonment of innocent people. Furr mentions that some conspiracies that were fed to Stalin were falsified, while others were true. This made it easy to blind him to what was actually happening during Yezhov’s repressions. It was done for his own self gain, aided by assisting fascist powers at the time. It would have been impossible to be certain of this immediately, considering the constant intelligence of conspiracies to be studied, preoccupation with the upcoming war, and figuring out what to believe over time. It’s noted that once this was realized, many of the prisoners arrested during Yezhovchina had their cases reviewed, and were set free, which was done with Beria in 1939.
So what do we make of all of this as a reader? It’s certainly a very well-researched book that can be overwhelming. Furr reinforces why these details are left out of so much history, and how it goes against the idea of “Stalin the dictator.” Statements as such are meant to address many of the uncertainties we as the readers might have, myself included. My personal opinion? It’s one of those works where the information contained in it is very valuable, but it probably won’t serve most as a great read from cover to cover. It works well as something to reference, especially if you familiarize yourself with one read to get a general understanding, first. Once that is understood, then perhaps pick through the documentation and Furr’s explanations of it as desired. Don’t expect to retain everything after just one pass. Noting the important parts and returning as needed could be helpful.
If nothing else, this gives us a nuanced look into something that many will dismiss as cut-and-dry. Would I take absolutely everything here at complete face value? Perhaps not right away, as this type of subject is good to analyze after reading several sources yourself. But it’s very clear that everything is viewed through the lens of someone writing for a different understanding, and not trying to sell a false narrative for no apparent reason. Yezhov Vs. Stalin shows that there was a heavy level of involvement in Soviet leadership, which was built with different levels of participation in differing areas and O’blasts, and how this can play into tragic events. In other words, it doesn't come down to just one guy, or some crazy idea of who he was. Josef Stalin may not be the ideal figure to everybody, but this certainly debunks any ridiculous claims of him being a murderous tyrant that mowed down anybody that voiced any kind of differing ideas.
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